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Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions on
Speech
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
The category of time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, as
supposedly distinct from absolute bans, appears to be central to free speech
law. Even a modest examination of the case law, however, suggests the
arbitrariness of any such distinction. Any familiar time, place, or manner
restriction on speech can be reasonably re-described as an absolute ban on
speech, and vice versa. Any differences in how the relevant regulations of
speech should be judicially tested, whether by differing degrees of rigor or
otherwise, are correspondingly arbitrary.
This Article recommends abandoning any attempt to substantively
distinguish between time, place, and manner restrictions and absolute
prohibitions of speech. The three currently used judicial tests for presumed
content-neutral restrictions on the supposed time, place, and manner of
speech should be substantially revised and consolidated. Any replacement
test should then de-emphasize concerns for any degree of narrowness of
tailoring, focusing instead on whether the regulated speakers are now
meaningfully worse off, in terms of their own free speech values, given
whatever channels of communication remain available to them after the
speech regulation in question has been imposed.

* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The category of time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, as
supposedly distinct from absolute bans, appears to be central to free speech
law.1 Even a modest examination of the case law, however, suggests the
arbitrariness of any such distinction.2 Any familiar time, place, or manner
restriction on speech can be reasonably re-described as an absolute ban on
speech, and vice versa.3 Any differences in how the relevant regulations of
speech should be judicially tested, whether by differing degrees of rigor or
otherwise, are correspondingly arbitrary.4
As it turns out, even the most promising attempts to reconceive and to
then validate the time, place, and manner versus absolute ban distinction are
unavailing.5 Compounding the problem is the dependence of the law of
time, place, and manner restrictions on an independently flawed distinction
between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech,6 and on
three dubious current judicial tests for content-neutral restrictions on
speech, no two of which tests are realistically equivalent.7
This Article recommends abandoning any attempt to substantively distinguish between time, place, and manner restrictions and absolute prohibitions of speech.8 The three currently used judicial tests for presumedly content-neutral restrictions on the supposed time, place, and manner of speech
should be substantially revised and consolidated. Any replacement test
should then de-emphasize concern for degrees of narrowness of tailoring.9
Instead, the courts should, in accordance with the basic underlying logic of
freedom of speech, focus crucially on whether the regulated speakers are
now meaningfully worse off, in terms of their own free speech values, giv-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57-90 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-123 and accompanying text.
See id. (drawing upon notes 33-56 and accompanying text.).
See infra Section III.
See infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
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en whatever channels or means of communication remain available to them
after the speech regulation in question has been imposed.10
II.

INTRODUCING THE DISTINCTION AND ITS ASSOCIATED LEGAL TESTS

The category of legal restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
speech is widely familiar and well-established. A leading First Amendment
expert, Professor Robert Post, has declared that such cases involve “among
the most important and most frequently invoked11 contemporary First
Amendment tests.”12
This common13 judicial recourse to the category of time, place, or14
manner (below, frequently, abbreviated as TPM) restrictions has been recurringly validated by Supreme Court decisions. Merely for example, the
postal walkway public forum case of United States v. Kokinda15 clearly
seeks to distinguish TPM regulations of solicitation speech from an absolute prohibition16 on such speech, or from permitting “no manner of solicitation at any time or at any place in the forum.”17 Crucially, the idea of alternative ways of speaking, apart from on-the-spot solicitation, and of alternative venues in which to speak, whether involving any solicitation or not,
are simply not meaningfully explored by the Court in Kokinda.18
The courts generally assume that when a speech regulation “is simply
a time, place, or manner regulation rather than a total ban of a particular
10. See infra notes 124-132 and accompanying text.
11. A Westlaw search of the state and federal cases database for “‘time, place, and
manner’ /s speech” yielded 2,956 citations as of December 30, 2019.
12. Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1260 (1995); see Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 314, 324-25 (2019)
(“[T]he characterization of a law as a ban tends to trigger a per se rule of invalidity . . . “);
see also William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The
Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
757, 758 (1986) (“[T]he Court gives only the most cursory scrutiny to time, place, and manner regulations of inexpensive forms of communications.”).
13. See Post, supra note 12.
14. We herein ignore the distinction between regulations of time, place, or manner
and regulations of time, place, and manner. Despite the logical importance of distinguishing
between disjunction (“or”) and conjunction (“and”), this distinction in the case law context is
unproblematic.
15. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
16. See id. at 755.
17. Id. (emphases omitted). For further Supreme Court references to, or attempts to
draw, a distinction between absolute prohibitions and TPM regulations of speech, see, for
example, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993) (in the
context of regulating commercial, but not other sorts of, news racks); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 397, 408-09 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (“A prohibition on fighting
words is not a time, place, or manner restriction . . .”).
18. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 755.
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medium of expression”19 we should recognize that “different factors come
into play.”20 No such differences in judicial analyses would be thought necessary unless there were some sufficient substantive difference between
TPM regulations and absolute bans. On this assumption, it is thought that a
greater level justification may be required “when the speech regulation
takes the form of a ban, rather than a time, place, or manner restriction.”21
Thus, an “absolute prohibition”22 of speech, as explicitly distinct from a
“mere regulation of speech,”23 is claimed to be more strongly disfavored,
and “has withstood constitutional scrutiny only in rare circumstances.”24
At least in part, “complete speech bans”25 are thought to be significantly different from, and generally worse than, “restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of expression”26 on the theory that they are “particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain information.”27 Complete bans, as distinct from TPM regulations, are
thus often imagined to leave potential speakers with no appropriate alternative channels in which to effectively express their ideas.28
Under the Court’s developing case law, restrictions on speech that are
judged to amount to an absolute bar or a flat prohibition on speech are
deemed to be either absolutely, or else “presumptively,”29 invalid, at least
where the restriction is thought to be based not merely on the content of the
speech, but more specifically, on its viewpoint.30 Whether this logic should

19. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521, 527 n.6 (1991)
(Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
20. Id. (Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring); see also, e.g., Excalibur Group v.
City of Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1997).
21. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310-311 n.1 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d 1279, 1287 n.6 (10th Cir. 1982) (McKay,
J., dissenting) (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
SUP. CT. REV. 233, 239-45 (1974)).
23. Thompson, 687 F.2d at 1287 n.6.
24. Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972)).
25. 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J.)
(commercial advertising case).
26. Id.
27. Id. But see the alternative speech channels analysis infra notes 124-132 and
accompanying text.
28. See infra Section III for complications and critique.
29. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (quoting Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995)); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135
S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (apparently equating “no power to restrict” with a rebuttable, but
strong, presumption against viewpoint and content-based restrictions on speech).
30. See the authorities cited supra note 29; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765
(2017) (describing viewpoint-based discrimination as “a form of speech suppression so
potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny,” with that test then deemed
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extend not just to bans but to TPM restrictions on the basis of viewpoint
may depend upon whether the basic distinction between absolute prohibitions and TPM regulations can be sustained.31
Content-based restrictions on speech, as a more general category, are
classically addressed by some form of strict scrutiny, thus requiring a compelling governmental interest deemed to be at stake, along with sufficiently
close tailoring of the purpose of the regulation to its effects on the interests
of affected parties.32 Content-neutral restrictions on speech, in general, are
tested rather differently.
Most importantly for our purposes, speech restrictions that are
deemed, on whatever logic, to be both content-neutral and to bear only upon the time, place, and manner of the expression of the speech are subjected
to one of three judicial tests. These tests are commonly thought, mistakenly
or not, to be less demanding in their rigor than classical strict scrutiny. And
the three tests are also commonly thought, again mistakenly or not, to be
more or less equivalent in practice.
Thus the Court has declared, first, that
the government may impose reasonable restrictions
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech,
provided the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.”33
to have been failed in Tam) (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
31. See infra Section III. Of course, since a trademark registration ‘ban’ leaves the
mark's general use in commerce otherwise open and unregulated, see Tam, 137 S. Ct. at
1752, one might well describe the registration “ban” in Tam as a restriction on the time,
place, or manner of the use of the mark.
32. For the Court’s most recent elaboration of a strict scrutiny test for content-based
restrictions on speech, however ultimately satisfactory, see Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226, 2231
(striking down a number of local restrictions on the display of non-commercial signs). For
instances of content-based speech restrictions surviving strict scrutiny, see, for example,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992). For broad critique of the use and coherence of this category, see R. George Wright,
Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081 (2015); R. George Wright, Content-Based and
Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 333 (2006).
33. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)), quoted in McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014). See also, e.g., Price v. City of Chicago, 915 F.3d 1107, 1112
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This test, which both screens for34 and then applies to content-neutral regulations of TPM restrictions, may be referred to as the Clark test.35
The Clark case itself, however, also endorses an alternative test, devised originally for use in cases of content-neutral regulations of symbolic
speech, or of mixed speech and conduct.36 This alternative test is drawn
from the draft card burning case of United States v. O’Brien.37 Clark refers
to the O’Brien test as “in the last analysis . . . little, if any, different from
the standard applied [in Clark] to time, place, or manner restrictions”38 on
speech.
The supposedly equivalent O’Brien test, in turn, holds that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if
it is [otherwise] within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential39 to the furtherance of that interest.40
While these tests will be briefly compared below,41 we merely note here
that while the Clark and the O’Brien tests are thought to be functionally
equivalent, at least over some significant range of cases,42 it is clear that
Clark and its progeny require that ample alternative speech channels be left

(7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. 781); City of New Orleans v. Clark, 251 So. 3d
1047, 1053 (La. 2018). The Supreme Court Clark case involved symbolic speech in the form
of sleeping in tents in public parks. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 289.
34. Note the requirement that the speech regulation at issue be “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
35. Ward in particular seeks to take the edge off of any unduly rigorous narrow
tailoring requirement. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-800.
36. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298-99; see also, e.g., Doe v. Landry, 909 F.3d 99, 108
(5th Cir. 2018) (recognizing Clark's endorsement of the O'Brien symbolic or mixed speech
and conduct test as supposedly equivalent in practice to the Clark test itself).
37. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
38. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298.
39. But see supra note 35 (regarding the degree of tailoring thought to be required).
40. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. See also, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S.
277, 296-97 (2000) (plurality opinion) (applying the O'Brien test explicitly in the context of
a local prohibition on nudity in public places); Turner Broad. Sy., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
189 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) (applying the O'Brien test explicitly in the context of federal rules
requiring cable television systems to carry local broadcasting).
41. See infra Section III.
42. See supra note 36.
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open and available for the regulated speakers,43 whereas O’Brien and its
progeny equally clearly do not.44
The third current test for content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions is expressed in the erotic movie theater zoning case of City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.45 and elsewhere.46 The purported time,
place, and manner regulation47 in Renton, conceived of as either contentneutral, or at least as fairly treatable as content-neutral,48 was explicitly held
to be constitutionally acceptable if such a regulation is “designed to serve a
substantial government interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication.”49
Thus, fascinatingly, the Renton case and its progeny50 adopt a test for
content-neutral TPM regulations that explicitly differs from both Clark,
which Renton cites,51 and O’Brien, but in entirely different ways. Renton,
unlike Clark,52 does not formally impose any tailoring requirement, even
though Renton does refer at a later point to considerations of tailoring.53
43. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also City of Ladue v. Gileo, 512
U.S. 43, 55-57 (1994) (distinguishing “laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression”
from TPM regulations and ultimately finding insufficient remaining channels of communication to be available, pursuant to the Clark test).
44. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Note that a test requiring ample
available alternative speech channels may actually be more demanding, in some cases, than
a test requiring rigorously narrow tailoring. See infra Section III.
45. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
46. See, e.g., Stardust, 3007 LLC v. City of Brookhaven, 899 F.3d 1164, 1173-74
(11th Cir. 2018); HH Indianapolis, LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis & Marion, 889 F.3d
432, 438 (7th Cir. 2018); Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia,
846 F.3d 391, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (relying on the Renton test while also specifically referring to Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015), on the scope of the contentneutral speech restriction category for a lamppost sign-posting regulation). Note that all of
these cases post-date Reed's tightening of the scope of content-neutrality. See id. at 2228; see
also Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 456-57 (8th Cir. 2019) (anti-loitering regulation).
47. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47.
48. See id. at 47 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)). The later Reed case, 135 S. Ct. at 2228, appears to have overruled, without
mentioning in the main opinion, the Renton Court’s determination that regulations can be
content-based on their face, but should still be treated as content-neutral, if they are justified
without reference to speech content, but instead on the basis of harmful secondary effects
associated with the regulated speech, such littering or other petty crimes. See id. But see
cases cited supra note 46 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 41). This unfortunate uncertainty over
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions of speech contributes
further to the force of our argument below.
49. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. Renton thus at least refers to alternative speech channels, whether as generously as in Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, or not.
50. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 46.
51. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
52. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. Renton then
later in the main opinion refers to sufficient tailoring. See id. at 52.
53. Note that the Renton majority included a total of seven of the Justices.
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And Renton, unlike O’Brien,54 does impose some form of a potentially crucial requirement that the regulation in question “not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”55
The law thus provides for three evidently distinct and independent
tests for content-neutral56 supposed time, place, and manner restrictions of
speech. Ultimately, a judicial choice must be made from among these three
alternatives, from some combination thereof, or some alternative thereto.
But no such choice can be responsibly made until the purported distinction
between TPM regulations and absolute prohibitions of speech is assessed
and critiqued. This task is undertaken immediately below.
III.

THE TPM VERSUS BAN DISTINCTION IN PRACTICE:

PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES

The free speech cases routinely attempt to distinguish between time,
place, or manner restrictions and absolute bans or prohibitions of speech.
These distinctions are typically drawn without any meaningful reflection,
analysis, or even indirect recourse to any theory. While we should hardly
expect courts in free speech cases to commonly do interesting theoretical
work, the cases typically do not refer, even at second hand, to any theory of
how the TPM versus absolute ban distinction is to be understood and applied. The typical case, as a result, fails to see the arbitrariness of its own
assumedly intuitive judgments. The TPM versus absolute ban distinction is
instead typically treated as sometimes tricky, but not interestingly problematic. As it turns out though, this casual judicial approach to the distinction is
itself ultimately arbitrary.
The Supreme Court has addressed the TPM versus absolute ban distinction, in some fashion, on a number of occasions.57 For example, in the

54. See supra text accompanying note 40 (imposing a tailoring requirement, but no
alternative speech channels requirement).
55. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The fact that Renton's test plainly differs substantially,
but in entirely different ways, from both Clark and O’Brien does not do much for the purported equivalence in practice of Clark and O’Brien. See supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
56. Of course, under state law, it will often be permissible to adapt the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral restrictions to more stringently protect speech.
See, e.g., Club SinRock, LLC v. Municipality of Anchorage, 445 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Alaska
2019) (adult cabaret speech).
57. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews For Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569,
575 (1987); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489, 501-02 (1996); Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483-85 (1988).
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case of the major Los Angeles Airport terminal,58 the Court appears to have
been led by the perceived breadth and sweepingness of the speech restriction to classify the regulation on First Amendment activity as an absolute ban, rather than a mere TPM regulation.59 The chosen spatial context
seems to have been the geographic space normally available to passengers
at the LAX airport.60 Restrictions on speech within some geographically
narrower sections of the airport might presumably have been classified, in
contrast, as TPM regulations.
In the commercial speech context, the Court has addressed61 state legislation that “prohibits [the relevant parties] from advertising in any manner
whatsoever the price of any alcoholic beverage offered for sale in the
State.”62 The Court treated the regulatory scheme as a complete ban “on
truthful, non-misleading commercial speech,”63 and declared that “when a
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of a truthful, non-misleading
commercial message”64 for paternalistic reasons, such prohibitions will be
strongly disfavored.65 The plurality concluded that “there is no question that
Rhode Island’s price advertising ban constitutes a blanket prohibition
against truthful, non-misleading speech about a lawful product.”66
Interestingly, the Court explicitly recognized the existence of a meaningful exception to what it nonetheless classified as a total ban on a particular kind of speech.67 Specifically, the regulatory scheme clearly allowed for
alcohol price advertising in the limited form and context of “price tags or
signs displayed with the merchandise within licensed premises and not visible from the street.”68
Now, this exception to an otherwise more complete ban was plainly
limited in scope and consequence. But it was also not trivial, in that price
advertising competition is clearly permitted at the point at which the deci58. See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs, 482 U.S. at 575 (“[N]o conceivable government
interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech [within the main airport terminal area].”).
59. See id.
60. See id. This case’s opting to classify the regulation as a complete ban on speech
has been relied upon or acknowledged by a number of cases, including Preminger v. Sec’y
of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Huminski v. Corsones, 396
F.3d 53, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2005); Parks v. Finan, 385 F.3d 694, 703 (6th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 579 n.14 (1st Cir. 1991); ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835
F.2d 735, 743 (10th Cir. 1987).
61. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489.
62. Id. (quotation marks deleted).
63. See id. at 502.
64. Id. at 501.
65. See id.
66. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 504 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion).
67. See id. at 489.
68. Id.
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sion to purchase, or not purchase, from among competing brands is commonly made. So, some judicial explanation is necessary for treating a regulation with a practically meaningful exception as, nonetheless, a complete
prohibition.69 After all, the Court is not thereby following standard usage. A
“complete ban” on, say, music, that exempted some folk music would not
be recognized, for ordinary purposes, as in fact a complete ban on music. A
“complete ban” on speech except for a few minutes before and after sunset
would similarly not ordinarily be deemed a genuinely “complete ban” at all.
Equally interestingly, the Court has also treated what in a sense might
constitute complete prohibitions of speech as, instead, mere time, place, or
manner restrictions. In Frisby v. Schultz,70 the Court addressed a town ordinance “that completely bans picketing ‘before or about’ any residence,”71
including from traditional public fora such as sidewalks.72 It could thus be
said that the ordinance absolutely prohibited, in its entirety, the speech activity describable as focused or directed picketing.73
Yet the Court did not treat the ordinance in Frisby as a complete ban.
There are, after all, a number of picketing, marching, demonstrating, and
other protest messaging techniques, arguably quite similar in character in
some requests, that remain unregulated by the “focused” picketing restriction at issue.74 Protesters may still march into residential neighborhoods, go door- to-door, and distribute literature.75 Thus, it was held in
Frisby that “the ordinance permits the more general dissemination of a
message.”76 As a presumably content-neutral restriction of the time, place,
and manner of speech, the ordinance was thus subject to one of the available tests for such regulations.77
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's arbitrariness as to the TPM versus absolute ban distinction has resulted in pervasive arbitrariness at the
court of appeals level. Thus, a statute prohibiting the in-person and the written solicitation of workers’ compensation claimants, while leaving other
forms of client solicitation unregulated, was classified as “a complete
69. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
70. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
71. Id. at 476.
72. See id. at 480.
73. See id. at 483.
74. See id. at 483-84.
75. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84.
76. Id. at 483.
77. See id. at 481, 484 (requiring that the presumably content-neutral restriction of
the time, place, and manner of the speech be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication”) (citing
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass’n, 480 U.S. 37, 45 (1980) (public forum
case)). The test in Perry is thus closely akin to what we have referred to as the Clark test,
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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ban,”78 and “thus . . . incompatible with the First Amendment.”79 But in
contrast, an ordinance prohibiting all sitting or standing on street medians
less than a yard wide,80 and thus not completely banning panhandling or
soliciting,81 was classified merely as “a restriction on sitting or standing”82
on the medians in question.83 The presumed TPM restriction84 in question
was then addressed under the Clark85 test.86
Regulations of the use of portable commercial outdoor signs, whether
or not exceptions are made for temporary uses, are commonly treated not as
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of commercial speech, but as
complete bans on the affected speech.87 Again, we would need some as yet
unsupplied theory as to why such regulations, given any exceptions thereto,
as well as the remaining range of alternative means of advertising commercially, could not equally be treated as TPM regulations. In the meantime,
we would also have to face the striking anomaly that some restrictions
classed as TPM regulations are in practice broader and more substantively
restrictive of speech than some restrictions classed as flat bans.
Any number of other cases could be cited in which speech restrictions
are classed as either TPM regulations or else as complete bans of some
forms of speech, but where the reason for the classification is left underdeveloped.88 Cases such as, for further example, the complete prohibition of
78. Bevan & Associates, LPA v. Yost, 929 F.3d 366, 379 (6th Cir. 2019).
79. Id.
80. See Evans v. Sandy City, 944 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2019).
81. See id. at 853.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
86. See Evans, 944 F.3d at 854.
87. See, e.g., FF Cosmetics FL, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 866 F.3d 1290, 1300
(11th Cir. 2017) (referring to Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1510 (11th Cir.
1992) and its “complete ban on off-premises signs in the . . . historic district”) (applying the
commercial speech test of Central Hudson v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980))
(requiring reasonably proportionate tailoring, but ignoring any alternative speech channels
analysis); Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1052 & 1052 n.2
(11th Cir. 1987) (portable sign regulation permitting some temporary portable signs apparently treated, by consent, as a “total ban” subject to the Central Hudson test, supra, again
rejecting any inquiry into any alternative available channels of commercial expression);
Harnish v. Manatee Cty., 783 F.2d 1535, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1986) (prohibition of portable
and changeable-copy temporary signs, but not of other signs or forms of commercial advertising, treated as a total ban and adjudicated under Clark, supra note 33 and accompanying
text). In the commercial speech contexts, the Court has referred to “flat prohibitions of
speech” when the real target is only commercial speech that is actually or potentially misleading. See Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
88. See, e.g., Doe v. Landry, 909 F.3d 99, 116 (5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim of a “‘total ban’ on erotic dancing for individuals who are eighteen to twenty
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all message-bearing tattoos, while leaving unregulated all other means of
expressing one's idea, illustrate the basic untenability of the underlying distinction itself. It turns out that all TPM restrictions may be reconceived as
also, if not instead, flat prohibitions on some judicially relevant class of
speakers or speech.
But even if someone wishes to reject this conclusion, and to deny that
supposed TPM regulations are often more speech-burdening than some
supposed bans, it remains clear that TPM regulations may, at a minimum,
verge upon, and have the same effects as, a supposed complete prohibition
of speech. Clearly, TPM regulations can in some instances shade gradually
into what is thought of as an absolute prohibition. Thus, barring speech in
all possible venues and media, twenty-four hours per day, may be thought
of as a complete prohibition. Allowing speech for some period of time, in
one or more venues, would presumably then amount to a narrower TPM
regulatory regime on speech. But if the times and places left unregulated
are minimal--perhaps only an hour or a minute a day, in only one dubious
venue, should we change, and reduce the stringency of, the free speech test
because now only a broad TPM regulation is involved?89 And suppose that
the penalty for violating the complete ban is relatively light, but relatively
severe for violating the still quite broad TPM regulation.90 Should we really
continue to see the presumed absolute prohibition as the greater threat to
free speech, or as meriting a separate and more demanding test?
If we were indeed able to develop a coherent, consistent, and practically useful distinction between TPM regulations and absolute bans, we might
then be able tap into today's philosophical discussions of what is called
years old” on the grounds that the regulation referred only to alcohol-licensed establishments); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1218 (7th Cir. 1980) (denying local adult
book store ownership rights to persons convicted within the four previous years of any felony or various morals-related crimes is treated as a total prohibition with respect to the persons affected); Hawkins v. City & Cty. of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1288 (10th Cir. 1999)
(Galleria Mall as imposing “an absolute ban on leafletting and picketing in the Galleria”
while allowing promotional leaflets by Mall tenants, as well as leaving unaffected all other
venues in which anyone might permissibly speak); Indus. Acoustics Co. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d
717, 721 (9th Cir. 1990) (labor case referring to a rule that “is clear in its absolute prohibition of campaign speeches made within 24 hours of an election, on company time, to massed
workers”). Or consider an absolute prohibition of all tattoos that would otherwise qualify as
speech. Why not view such a prohibition as (also) merely a regulation, whether constitutionally justified or not, of the manner in which one speaks? For discussion of this unclear “denominator” or “baseline” problem, see Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 312
(2019).
89. Otherwise put, bans are on, this view, merely the extreme or “limiting case.”
This logic applies whether the restriction in both cases is content-neutral or content-based.
90. For general background, but only partially under a free speech, as distinct from
a procedural due process, perspective, see Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123 (1992).
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mereology, or the study of parts and wholes,91 as well as the mathematics of
sets and proper subsets.92 But we have no such worthwhile distinction.93
Perhaps the best we could then do would be to instead draw from the
literature on the level of generality at which a legal issue should best be
framed.94 The literature on choosing some particular level of generality
recognizes that describing a series of events in general terms may make
those events seem more foreseeable than those same events described with
greater specificity.95 Whether we choose, for example, to describe a person
generally as a biological father or, more specifically, as an apparently adulterous father of a child in an intact family,96 may steer a legal case one way
or another. We seem, on this approach, to need the proper level of focus--a
wide angle perspective versus a perspective featuring close-up detail, as it
were--with which to best appreciate what is crucially at stake in the case.97
91. See GIORGIO LANDO, MEREOLOGY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION (2018);
PETER SIMONS, PARTS: A STUDY IN ONTOLOGY 1 (2003 ed.) (1987) (mereology as involving
formal theories of parts, wholes, and concepts related thereto); Archie J. Baum, Wholes and
Parts, 3 SW. J. PHIL. 17, 21 (1972) (“[T]here are various kinds of wholes, parts, and wholepart relations.”); Kit Fine, Towards a Theory of Parts, 107 J. PHIL. 559, 561 (2010) (applying the part-whole categories to abstractions, not just to concrete objects); Kris McDaniel,
Parts and Wholes, 5 PHIL. COMPASS 412, 413 (2010) (same); Achille Varzi, Mereology,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 13, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology
[https://perma.cc/QFX9-J78G].
92. See, e.g., PATRICK SUPPES, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 177-82 (John L. Kelley et
al. eds., 1999 ed.) (1957) (on basic set and proper subset theory); Joan Bagaria, Set Theory,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/set-theory
[https://perma.cc/5C9E-A5Q3]. In the legal context, see Jeremy N. Sheff, Legal Sets, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 2029, 2031 (2019) (“Set-based logic permeates mature legal systems, and
constitutes the deep structure connecting legal authorities to the behavior of legal actors.”);
id. at 2042 & 2042 n.30 (defining proper subsets in a way applicable to a coherent distinction between partial and complete speech regulations).
93. And the part-whole and set theory discussions, supra notes 91 and 92, do not
materially help us to develop any such distinction.
94. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791
(1983) (“Frequently an analysis turns completely on the level of generality at which some
feature of the issue under analysis is described.”); Blocher, supra note 88, at 329.
95. But cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 156-57 (2013) (hypothetical feminist bank teller study), in which additional detailed requirements are widely
thought to somehow add to the probability of the overall account.
96. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (classic debate between Justice Scalia and Brennan).
97. What might seem, under one photographic description, to be a highly magnified
image of carpet filaments or dust might be more illuminatingly presented instead as an image, at an immense distance, of the so-called “Pillars of Creation” gas clouds in the Eagle
Nebula, with the “threads” themselves covering a distance of perhaps half a dozen light
years. See The Pillars of Creation, NASA (Feb. 22, 2018), www.nasa.gov/imagefeature/the-pillars-of-creation [https://perma.cc/4HUK-WFKZ].
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Perhaps this inquiry into determining the proper level of generality in best
describing the facts and circumstances of a case could be modified, and
then applied to questions of whether to find a complete speech ban or else a
TPM regulation.
Choosing a single best level of generality of a legal description is,
however, noticeably plagued by “indeterminacy and manipulability.”98
Clearly, “there is no universal metric of specificity against which to measure an asserted right.”99 Crucially, choosing the best level of generality of a
legal description and our own problem herein of choosing between the categories of total ban and TPM regulation suffer from a similar fundamental
problem. In our context, making the best, most value-illuminating choice is,
realistically, not merely a preliminary step toward eventually deciding the
case on the constitutional merits. That is, the best, most value-illuminating
choice as between the analytical labels of ban and TPM regulation requires
that the court already more or less fully understand the relevant free speech
and other interests, including their nature and weight, at stake in the case.
The courts thus must fully grasp all that is of genuine significance in a case
in order to perform well the supposedly preliminary task of choosing between the labels of ban and TPM regulation. Equally importantly, though,
even if the courts could somehow, at any stage, make independent, valuesensitive, and non-arbitrary judgments as to whether to characterize any
given speech restriction as a ban or a TPM regulation, that characterization
would then still be hostage to whatever deficiencies afflicted the remainder
of any overall judicial test the court then chose to apply.100
In particular, the judicial choice between the ban versus TPM categories typically depends, either as a prerequisite, or as a further element of the
test to be applied,101 on the distinction between content-neutral and contentbased restriction on speech.102 A court's classifying a speech restriction as a
TPM regulation or as total ban does not allow the court to somehow bypass

98. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084 (1981) (quoted in Tribe
& Dorf, supra note 94, at 1071).
99. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 94, at 1086.
100. See the various non-equivalent tests described supra Section II. For a more
optimistically constructive approach to the ban versus TPM distinction, see Blocher, supra
note 88, at 315-16.
101. The flag burning symbolic speech case of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1991), could be thought of as either applying the O'Brien test, 391 U.S. 367 377 (1968), and
finding the O'Brien test to have been failed, or else as applying strict judicial scrutiny to a
content-based restriction on political speech.
102. See the tests cited supra Section II.
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the crucial deficiencies of the content-based versus content-neutral distinction.103
This dependence on the further judicial category of content-based versus content-neutral restrictions on speech would be tolerable if this category
were in general reasonably consistently managed. But it is not. The TPM
versus total ban distinction is thus currently tied to a further category that is
of questionable utility and is burdened with its own frequent arbitrariness.
The dubiousness of the content-based versus content-neutral speech
restriction distinction manifests itself in a number of ways. First, the Court
itself has introduced compounding uncertainty as the scope of the basic idea
of a content-based restriction on speech.104 Under the Reed case,105 the
Court appears willing to impose strict judicial scrutiny on some regulations,
whether of commercial speech or not, where no significant current or future
risk to the unimpaired exchange of ideas is presently detectable.106
Second, what counts as a sufficiently compelling government interest107 for the strict scrutiny required of content-based restrictions is itself
vulnerable to the problem of choosing a proper level of generality of description.108 Broadly formulated government interests may seem more important than the same underlying interests more narrowly and specifically
described. Regardless, while we might think of a compelling government
interest as an interest “of the highest order,”109 the courts have, oddly, gone
so far as to recognize as compelling the government interest in the protection of golden, rather than bald, eagles, whether threatened as a species or
not.110 This curious, but not unparalleled, outcome calls into question the
judicial methodology for assigning constitutional weight to a government
interest.
Third, strict scrutiny is now sometimes held to require not only a compelling government interest, and perhaps some only vaguely specified de103. For the most recent explication of this distinction, leaving a number of important questions unaddressed, see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). For a
useful survey and critique, see Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s
Reach: Content Discrimination in the Courts of Appeal After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24
COMM. L. & POL’Y 191 (2019).
104. See, e.g., the unresolved questions as to the scope of a content-based restriction
left unresolved by the Court in Reed, as documented by Kozlowski & Silver, supra note 103.
105. See the sources cited, supra note 103.
106. Or at least, no greater risk thereto than would be posed by an assumedly content-neutral restriction of speech.
107. For useful background, see, for example, R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and
the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759 (2012).
108. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
109. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
110. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Hardiman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002)).
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gree of actual promotion or advancement thereof, but as well a compelling
or convincing evidentiary basis in the record for the government's logic of
regulation.111 In a world of multiple interacting causal factors, a judicial test
for the degree of “compellingness” of the evidentiary or causal logic of a
regulation will unavoidably be speculative and indeterminate.112
Fourth, there is the current rise in some but not yet all contexts of what
is referred to as “exacting scrutiny.”113 Exacting scrutiny is often thought of
not as a synonym for strict scrutiny, but as some sort of a merger or dilution
of strict scrutiny with a form of proportionalism114 balancing of the interests
and rights claims at stake in the case.115 Whatever the merits of such arguments within, or as a substitute for, strict scrutiny, these further complications add to the murky indeterminacies of strict scrutiny and its alternatives.
Fifth and finally, the need for TPM or even complete ban regulations
to accommodate the content-neutral versus content-based distinction means
that the case law will be held hostage to the specific further indeterminacies
of judicial findings as to narrow tailoring.116 There is, realistically, little
constraint on judicial declarations that some supposedly less speechburdensome regulation would, or would not, likely be feasible117 and would

111. See, e.g., Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th
Cir. 2001) (Posner, J., for the court).
112. See Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does—and Doesn't—Know, CITY JOURNAL
2010),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/what-social-science-does—and-doesn’t—know13297.html [https://perma.cc/9NZM-Q69Y] (discussing issues of “causal density”).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012) (“When contentbased speech regulation is in question . . . exacting scrutiny is required.”). See id. at 720,
724 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1984)).
114. For background on moral and constitutional forms of proportionalism, including
the First Amendment context, see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (David Dyzenhaus et. al. eds., Doron Kalir, trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012); Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality,
16 RATIO JURIS. 131 (2003). For a response, see FRANCISCO J. URBINA, A CRITIQUE OF
PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING (2017).
115. See generally R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC
L. REV. 207 (2016).
116. For background and complications, see R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces
of Narrowness: How the Courts Legitimize What They Do, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 167 (1997).
117. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (the speculative assumptions as to what might be politically viable at the state level, as alternative
forms of regulation in the commercial speech regulation).
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still materially and substantially advance118 one or more government interests.119
Perhaps the most basic problem in judicial narrow tailoring inquiries is
that the regulating government will typically have only incomplete and unreliable information as to the actual effects of its policies and of alternatives
thereto.120 Meanwhile, the affected parties recognize that their distinctive
free speech interests may well diverge from their own much broader, overall interests.121 More exotically, it is also possible that a judicial declaration
that a regulation is or is not narrowly tailored may itself affect the system
that the court is attempting to predict or describe,122 so as to in fact now
make some alternative rule either politically feasible or infeasible.123
As it happens, though, this dependence of the TPM versus flat prohibition distinction on the increasingly murky distinction between contentbased and content-neutral regulations is not inevitable. The interests of both
governments and private speakers can instead best be promoted in the TPM
versus prohibition cases by abandoning judicial inquiries into degrees of
policy tailoring, narrow or otherwise. Tailoring inquiries, as it turns out,
commonly miss the point.
Instead, speakers, insofar as they care about their speech, and the value, meaningfulness, and effectiveness of that speech, should logically care
not about degrees of tailoring of the speech regulation in question, but instead about whether the regulation leaves them with better, the same, or less
valuable alternative channels and venues in which to speak, in light of their
own free speech values and priorities.124 Degrees of narrowness of tailoring
118. For discussion of the constitutional significance of questions such as how far,
how much, or how substantially, a government regulatory interest has been promoted in
practice, see R. George Wright, Wiping Away the Tiers of Judicial Scrutiny, 93 St. JOHN’S L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020).
119. Despite continual gross oversimplification by courts, we should realistically
assume that regulations of speech, whether thought of as TPM or total bans, do not generally
aim at promoting only some single overriding and readily articulated government interest. It
would still be unrealistic, but distinctly less so, to assume that any given speech regulation
seeks to promote some complex function of partly overlapping and partly competitive goods.
120. See Wright, supra note 118.
121. Note, for example, that a proposed rule might maximize a regulated party’s free
speech values, but at some cost, overall, to that party’s profitability. All such cases may tend
to skew the speaker's testimony as to the actual free speech impact of alternative regulations.
122. The idea of significantly changing a system merely by observing or describing
that system amounts to a popular expansion of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. See
generally Jan Hilgevoord, Uncertainty Principle, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 8, 2001),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/L2D8-C93H].
123. Merely as one possible example, a court’s declaration that some alternative
policy would be more narrowly tailored may itself, for the first-time, focus public attention
on, render conspicuous, and legitimize that otherwise politically infeasible policy.
124. Cf. Blocher, supra note 88, at 327 (asking “what practical impact [a ban, specifically] has on a rightsholder’s ability to effectuate his or her constitutional interests”). For a
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may have only a minimal, if any, relationship to the degree to which a regulation harms a speaker, given that speaker’s own best remaining alternative
speech channels,125 in light of that speaker’s own free speech values and
priorities.126 More broadly, speakers have little interest in whether they
themselves, or the courts, classify a speech restriction as a TPM regulation
or a total ban. Instead, speakers should logically care about their current and
future speech options.
A regulation may not be at all well-tailored, and thus may cover an
unnecessarily broad range of activities, while at the same time also leaving
open and available a speaker's best speech channel options, or nearly best
such options, from that speaker's own perspective. Imagine, say, an insufficiently tailored regulation of the use of campaign posters in the case of a
billionaire electoral candidate who rarely or only minimally utilizes such
posters, and who would lose essentially nothing, in terms of free speech
values, by shifting such from poster-speech to some unregulated alternative
speech channel.127 And certainly, a speech regulation can be remarkably
narrowly tailored, while leaving an affected speaker effectively mute.
Importantly, this emphasis on alternative speech channels holds regardless of whether a court chooses to categorize a speech restriction as one
of TPM or as a complete ban. The courts can, and should, thus bypass the
hopeless indeterminacies and sheer arbitrariness in trying to distinguish
between TPM and complete ban regulations by focusing crucially on the
availability, for the speaker, of constitutionally adequate alternative channels of communication. Certainly, what the courts have referred to as total
bans on some class of speech128 could, depending upon the circumstances,
leave a given speaker's free speech values essentially unimpaired. Equally,
what a court characterizes as a mere TPM regulation may have an unavoid-

comprehensive view of the basic values thought to underlie and justify constitutional protection of speech, including the pursuit of truth or knowledge, democratic self-government, and
the pursuit of autonomous self-realization and development, see Kent Greenawalt, Free
Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
125. Otherwise put, speakers should logically care, as speakers, about the real opportunity costs, in free speech value terms, of complying with a speech regulation. See generally David R. Henderson, Opportunity Cost, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OpportunityCost.html[https://perma.cc/LM86-6XQD].
126. Which, again, may not correspond to the speaker's own broader, non-speech
related values, including, say, corporate profitability.
127. Otherwise put, while it is doubtless true that a free speech right is “worthless in
the absence of a meaningful method of its expression,” Cuviello v. City of Vallejo, 944 F.3d
816, 825 (9th Cir. 2019), it is also true that even an insufficiently tailored, or overly broad,
speech restriction does a given speaker no practical harm if that speaker retains equally, or
more, valuable means of expressing their sentiments.
128. As illustrated by the purported “total ban” cases discussed supra Section II.
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ably devastating impact on a given speaker who has no realistically available alternative speech channels.129
What, then, could typically make a real difference to a given speaker
with regard to their free speech values? Otherwise put, insofar as a speaker
cares about their own freedom of speech, what sorts of considerations might
a speaker emphasize in assessing the value of any alternative channels in
which to speak?
As it turns out, these crucial considerations will not depend upon any
purported distinction between TPM regulations and speech prohibitions, or
on the directly implicated distinction between content-based and contentneutral regulations. An absolute ban on the use of streets and sidewalks
may be of minimal concern to a speaker who prefers to rely on social media. And a TPM regulation on speaking on Fridays may effectively censor
someone who, for whatever reason, can speak only on Fridays.
Logic suggests that speakers, insofar as they care about their own
freedom of speech, including any overlap with that of their audience, might
focus, to one degree or another, on a number of considerations. Among
these dimensions of free speech value would be: (1) the sheer size of an
actual or potential audience, immediately or else indirectly and over time;
(2) the costs of obtaining responsive feedback or ongoing dialogue with
audience members; (3) the given medium or channel's capacity to handle
nuance or detail; (4) the given medium or channel's capacity for emotional
impact; (5) the given medium or channel’s vulnerability to outages, technical decay, hacking, sabotage, blocking, manipulation, or private party or
foreign government censorship; (6) the medium or channel’s capacity for
author-initiated editing or updating; (7) the likelihood of the message's
widespread accessibility over a substantial period of time; (8) timeliness or
immediate availability and download speeds; (9) prestige, or elite use of the
medium channel in question; (10) the suitability, capacities, level of interest, influence, relevance, or appreciativeness of the likely audience; (11)
financial and other costs of access to the medium or channel in question;
(12) the capacity of the medium or channel for ready technical updating and
for handling simultaneous multi-user demand for large amounts of data
with reasonable reliability; (13) the medium or channel’s capacity to protect
the confidentiality or anonymity of listeners and speakers;130 and (14) any

129. Consider, for example, the impact on non-English speakers who lack translators
of a rule restricting the ability to speak any language other than English in a government
office. For background in the broader workplace context, see 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 on broad
and narrow English-only rules.
130. As in, classically, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (anonymous handbill
case); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (anonymous election and
issue-related publications case).
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important legal liability rules regarding speech and commentary on the medium or channel.
Of course, no particular speaker may care about most, let alone all, of
these considerations in assessing the value, for free speech purposes,131 of
their alternative speech channels or media. Nor should we expect all speakers to seek to maximize their own freedom of speech at the expense of all
other concerns, interests, and values.132 But insofar as speakers care about
their own freedom of speech, and necessarily therein about an audience,
they rationally care about the free speech value of their remaining speech
channels, rather than about issues of regulatory labeling and tailoring.
Crucially, no reasonable speaker should logically find any substantial
free speech interest value in the entirely artificial, and ultimately arbitrary,
distinction between time, place, and manner restrictions and absolute prohibitions of speech.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most sense we can make out of the time, place, and manner versus absolute prohibition of speech distinction is that we normally
tend to adopt the former label when the speech restriction happens to strike
us, for whatever reason, as in some sense relatively narrow, and we adopt
the latter label when it does not. The problem is that restrictions on speech
do not come with unequivocally applicable measures of their practical narrowness and breadth. Narrowness and breadth of a restriction will always
be relative to, and dependent upon, some descriptive and evaluative framework, which must be chosen, on whatever grounds, from among alternative,
and more or less equally reasonable, such frameworks. No neutral standpoint, from which the best judgments of regulatory narrowness and breadth
can be uniformly made, is available.
This realization should, more positively, allow us to de-emphasize, if
not to dispense with, free speech tests, or components thereof, that do not
closely correspond to the real speech and public interests and values at
stake in any given case. Specifically, this realization should encourage
courts, in deciding typical free speech cases, to focus more attentively on

131. It is possible to prefer one speech channel to another for reasons irrelevant to
one’s wish to speak freely, or even for reasons contrary to broader, overall free speech values. Thus, a group might prefer to speak through sustained multi-person picketing in hopes
of thereby intimidating, if not coercing, bypassers into a preferred behavior, without convincing anyone of the merits of the group’s stance.
132. It is thus possible that a rule allowing for-profit commercial enterprises to advertise more uninhibitedly might actually be resisted by one or more of the affected commercial parties, as tending to cut into overall corporate profitability.
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the free speech value, from the speaker’s perspective, of any remaining
alternative channels of speech left open and available to that speaker.

